Pace International Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 1 Winter 2010

Article 1

January 2010

Giving Every Child a Chance: The Need for Reform and
Infrastructure in Intercountry Adoption Policy
Rachel J. Wechsler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr

Recommended Citation
Rachel J. Wechsler, Giving Every Child a Chance: The Need for Reform and Infrastructure in
Intercountry Adoption Policy, 22 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 1 (2010)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 1 Side A

04/13/2010 15:24:25

\\server05\productn\P\PIR\22-1\PIR101.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

13-APR-10

14:08

PACE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Volume XXII, Number I

Winter 2010

ARTICLES
GIVING EVERY CHILD A CHANCE:
THE NEED FOR REFORM AND
INFRASTRUCTURE IN INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION POLICY
Rachel J. Wechsler*
INTRODUCTION

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 1 Side A

Currently, there are approximately 9.5 million children living in orphanages in the developing world, and this figure is
expected to increase dramatically to 25 million by 2010 due to
the HIV/AIDS pandemic.1 Intercountry adoption,2 the “process
by which a married couple or single individual of one country
adopts a child from another country,”3 took hold following
World War II when many members of Western nations learned
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania; M.Sc., Oxford University; B.S., Cornell
University (Hons.). The author sincerely thanks Professor Gideon Parchomovsky
for his mentorship and insightful comments throughout the writing process. This
article would also not have been possible without the unending support of Amy
Wechsler and Steven Evers.
1 Ethan B. Kapstein, The Baby Trade, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 118, 115 (2003).
2 Also called international adoption, transnational adoption, and cross-country adoption.
3 Notesong Srisopark Thompson, Hague is Enough?: A Call for More Protective, Uniform Law Guiding International Adoptions, 22 WIS. INT’L L.J. 441, 442
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of the plight of homeless children as a result of the conflict. The
popularity of intercountry adoption steadily increased over the
course of the Twentieth Century, with a significant jump immediately following the Korean War.4 In the 1980s, it was estimated that more than one million families were interested in
adoption in the United States alone.5 In addition to sympathy
for displaced children, this phenomenon has coincided with decreasing numbers of domestic children available for adoption in
industrialized nations due to increased access to contraception
and abortion, a lessening of the stigma associated with single
parenthood,6 and an increase in infertility. Infertility rates
have increased because of a tendency to attempt childbearing at
later ages7 and environmental contaminants such as PCBs in
food, air, and water that have led to significant decreases in
sperm count.8
However, in recent years, the number of children adopted
from abroad into U.S. families has dropped significantly.9 In
2007, the number of foreign adoptions to the U.S. was 19,411,
which represents a fifteen percent drop over the previous two
years.10 Currently, Americans are adopting fewer than 18,000
foreign-born orphans a year,11 which is the lowest number since
1999.12 If this trend reflected a decrease in the number of aban-
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(2004) (citing CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION GUIDELINES 97 (1980)).
4 Thompson, supra note 3, at 446.
5 Bridget M. Hubing, International Child Adoptions: Who Should Decide
What Is In The Best Interests of the Family?, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 655, 659 (2001) (citing Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163, 1166 n.5
(1991)).
6 Id.
7 Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 433 (2004).
8 Gabriela Marquez, Transnational Adoption: The Creation and Ill Effects of
an International Black Market Baby Trade, 21 J. JUV. L. 25, 26 (2000) (citing LORI
CARANGELO, STATISTICS OF ADOPTION 24 (Lori Carangelo ed., 2000) (1999), available at http://www.amfor.net/statistics.html).
9 Adoptions of Foreign Kids Decline in U.S., ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 1,
2007, at A27.
10 Id.
11 Overseas Adoption Roadblocks (CNN television broadcast Dec. 30, 2008),
available at http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/health/2008/12/30/am.verjee.adopting.overseas.cnn?iref=videosearch.
12 David Crary, Foreign Adoptions at 9-year Low: China, Russia, Other Countries Add Restrictions, REC. N. N.J., Nov. 28, 2008, at A26; David Crary, Foreign
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doned children worldwide, it would be an extremely positive development. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The major
reasons for the reduction in international adoptions are stricter
policies on the part of both sending13 and receiving nations.14
For example, in 2007, China enacted regulations disqualifying
foreign adoption applicants who were single, overweight, over
the age of fifty,15 or recently divorced.16 Even more extreme,
Romania adopted a ban on virtually all international adoptions
in January of 2005.17 This prohibition is not in the best interest
of Romania’s many children living in institutions, but rather is
a self-serving political policy enacted in an attempt to gain European Union (“EU”) membership.18 Sending countries’ restrictions cannot be entirely attributed to their own governments
because receiving nations have played a role in many of these
policy decisions. For example, the EU pushed for the aforementioned Romanian ban on intercountry adoption, and EU experts
even helped Romania craft the law.19 Also, receiving countries
have at times blocked their citizens from adopting from certain
sending countries, such as when the U.S. declared in December
2002 that it would not grant visas to Cambodian children that
American parents sought to adopt.20
The result of hindering or halting the intercountry adoption
process is the increased suffering of institutionalized and homeless children whose basic needs remain unmet. Although cor-
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Adoption Take Big Dip: 12% Drop in Past Year Guatemala, China Top Countries
Now, But New Restrictions Ahead, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A4.
13 Adoptions of Foreign Kids Decline in U.S., supra note 9; Hubing, supra note
5, at nn.28 & 29. Sending nations are adoptees’ native countries. Conversely, receiving nations are the prospective parents’ home countries.
14 Sara Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect
Human Rights Principles: Transforming the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child with the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U.
INT’L L.J. 179, 241-42 (2003).
15 Calum MacLeod, Foreign Adoptions from China Fall: More Chinese Adopting; Fewer Children Available, USA TODAY, Nov. 21, 2007, at 1A.
16 The Adoption Morass, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 2007, at C8.
17 Molly S. Marx, Comment, Whose Best Interests Does It Really Serve? A Critical Examination of Romania’s Recent Self-Serving International Adoption Policies, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 373, 374 (2007).
18 Id. at 389.
19 Romania Curbs Foreign Adoptions, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3810425.stm.
20 Gina Barton, Couple Hope Baby Will Be Theirs, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
May 27, 2002.
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ruption and other problems that tend to occur in the
intercountry adoption process are far from ideal, they are arguably the lesser of two evils when compared with the conditions that orphaned and homeless children must endure in their
own countries. Moreover, the resilience of children living in institutional care or on the streets further tips the scale in favor
of international adoption. Longitudinal research studies have
determined that intercountry adoptees function just as well as
most domestic adoptees and biological children of the same socioeconomic status, even if the foreign-born children suffered
from untreated illnesses and severe neglect at a young age.21
Over the years, intercountry adoption has proven to be an effective solution to the chronic problem of orphaned children.
Therefore, it is time for the international community to increase
the efficiency of and supervision over this process.
This essay is both descriptive and normative in nature. It
aims to describe the current intercountry adoption regime along
with its problems, and to propose a much-needed solution. At
the outset, this essay explains the great need for intercountry
adoption while highlighting empirical research on child development. Secondly, it gives an overview of past and present international adoption policy. Thirdly, this essay describes the
problems that exist under the current policy regime. Finally, it
proposes an international agency and family court as a new approach to intercountry adoption that will solve many of the failures of the current system.
FOR
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I. NEED

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION

There is a tremendous need for intercountry adoption in order to help the millions of children living on the streets and in
institutions and the numerous families that long for children.
This section of the essay first examines the statistics supporting
the contention that the supply of adoptable children and demand for them on the part of prospective adoptive parents can
fulfill one another if united through the process of intercountry
adoption. The second part of this section highlights empirical
research demonstrating the negative effects of living in an insti21 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, Intercountry Adoption: A Frontier Without
Boundaries, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 216 (Naomi R. Cahn &
Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004).
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tution upon children’s development. Together, these components underscore the need for an international effort to improve
and streamline the intercountry adoption system.
A. Supply and Demand
Each year, millions of children find themselves without
families, homes, or care.22 Most of these children live in developing countries wrought with poverty, war, political turmoil,
and/or natural disasters that, consequently, do not have adequate resources to care for them.23 For example, in China
alone, there are upwards of 150,000 street children, a figure
that continues to rise.24 Worldwide, the number of homeless
children was estimated at 100 million in the mid-1990s, which
is the most recent statistic.25 As previously noted, there are
currently approximately 9.5 million children living in orphanages in the developing world, and this figure is expected to jump
to 25 million by 2010 due to the HIV/AIDS pandemic.26
At the same time, certain developments in industrialized
nations, such as the availability of birth control, legal abortions
and the erosion of the social stigma associated with single
parenthood, have led to a decrease in the supply of domestic
children available for adoption.27 One significant trend is the
decrease in the pregnancy rate for women under the age of
twenty-five in the U.S. between 1990 and 2004.28 This includes
a decline in the proportion of teenage pregnancies from fifteen
28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 3 Side A

22 Margaret Liu, International Adoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 187, 187 (1994).
23 Id.; Marx, supra note 17, at 373; Jim L. Roby, Understanding Sending
Country’s Policies in International Adoptions: Avoiding Legal and Cultural Pitfalls, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 303, 317 (2004) (stating that national crises such as civil
war, natural disaster, or political turmoil often exacerbate a country’s inability to
aid its children in need).
24 Kun Li, Zhenzhou Centre Reaches Out with Care and Support for Street
Children, UNICEF NEWSLINE, Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.unicef.org/protection/
china_35431.html.
25 Uché U. Ewelukwa, Litigating the Rights of Street Children in Regional or
International Fora: Trends, Options, Barriers and Breakthroughs, 9 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 92 (2006).
26 Kapstein, supra note 1, at 118.
27 Marx, supra note 17, at 373-75.
28 Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Pregnancy Rate
Drops for U.S. Women Under Age 25 (Apr. 14, 2008), available at http://www.cdc.
gov/media/pressrel/2008/r080414.htm.
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percent of overall pregnancies in 1990 to twelve percent in
2004,29 which is a contributing factor in the falling number of
available domestic children, since teenage women are the group
most likely to put their children up for adoption.30 Moreover,
there has been a corresponding rise in the demand for adoptable children in developed nations due to an increase in infertility rates and a widening of the definition of ‘family’ to include
homosexual couples and blended relationships.31 Currently in
the U.S., the demand for healthy infants to adopt outstrips the
supply.32 In 2003, fewer than 14,000 children were given up for
adoption in the U.S.33 The ratio of prospective adopters to Caucasian, American infants available for adoption is approximately six to one.34 This proportion is probably even higher
than estimated because many Americans who would like to
adopt do not even attempt to do so because they are intimidated
by the process and fear high costs.35 International adoption
provides a logical solution to remedy both the supply and demand side problems: the large number of abandoned children in
certain countries and the great demand for adoptable children
in others.36

29

Id.
David Ray Papke, Pondering Past Purposes: A Critical History of American
Adoption Law, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 459, 475 n.96 (1999).
31 Kapstein, supra note 1, at 117.
32 Kara Beth Stein, Chapter 754: California’s Response to Adoption Facilitator
Fraud, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 136, 138 (2007) (citing Trish Maskew, Ethica: A
Voice for Ethical Adoption, in ADOPTION REG. AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 1 (2004)
(on file with the MCGEORGE L. REV.)).
33 CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VOLUNTARY RELINQUISHMENT FOR ADOPTION (2005),
available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_place.pdf.
34 Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 521 (2005);
Papke, supra note 30, at 474 (stating that there are too few healthy, white infants
to accommodate the great demand).
35 Samuels, supra note 34, at 521 (citing ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION:
HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICA 34 (2000)).
36 Liu, supra note 22, at 189; Marx, supra note 17, at 374-75; Amy Grillo
Kales, The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000: Are Its Laudable Goals Worth Its
Potential Impact on Small Adoption Agencies, Independent Intercountry Adoptions,
and Ethical Independent Adoption Professionals?, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
477, 479 (2004).
30
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B. Effects of Living in an Orphanage on a Child’s Well-being

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 4 Side A

A major justification for the necessity of intercountry adoption is the extensive research concluding that the institutional
environment, particularly with prolonged exposure, has detrimental effects on children’s intellectual and socio-emotional development.37 Perhaps even more worrisome than a failure to
fully meet children’s physical needs is the fact that, many orphanages do not have the resources to address children’s intellectual, social, and emotional needs. It is common for children
living in orphanages, particularly those in sending countries, to
lack consistent caregiver contact, emotional involvement from
their caregivers, and experiences outside of the institution.38
These conditions, which fail to provide children with the stability, sensitivity, and stimulation necessary for normative development, are key contributors to the developmental delays and
deficits that researchers have found among children living in
orphanages.
There is a multitude of empirical research asserting the
negative effects of orphanages with low-quality and/or unstable
care upon children’s development in a variety of areas. The severity of the developmental problems that many children living
in orphanages experience is indirectly related to the quality of
the social environment.39 The developmental deficits found in
children who have been institutionalized in orphanages in the
developing world can be more readily attributed to the lack of
appropriate social interactions than to material or physical
deprivation.40
37 Sharon Landesman, Institutionalization Revisited: Expanding Views on
Early and Cumulative Life Experiences, in HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 455-62 (Michael Lewis & Suzanne M. Miller eds., Plenum Press 1990);
Barbara Tizard, Early Experience and Later Social Behavior, in THE FIRST YEAR OF
LIFE (David Shaffer & Judy Dunn eds., 1979); Wayne Dennis, CHILDREN OF THE
CRECHE (1973); JOHN BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE (2d ed.
1965).
38 Shannah Tharp-Taylor, The Effects of Early Social Deprivation on Children
Reared in Foreign Orphanages, Feb. 11, 2003, at 9, available at ERIC, ED475594.
39 Id. at 4.
40 Panayiota Vorria et al., Comparative Study of Greek Children in LongTerm Residential Group Care and in Two-Parent Families: II. Possible Mediating
Mechanisms, 39 J. CHILD PSYCHOL., 237, 237-45 (1998); Barbara Tizard & Judith
Rees, The Effect of Early Institutional Rearing on the Behavior Problems and Affectional Relationships of Four-Year-Old Children, 27 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 61, 61-73 (1975) [hereinafter Tizard & Rees, Institutional Rearing]; Barbara
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During the first year of life, the presence or absence of sensitive and responsive caregiving becomes a powerful regulator
of emotional behavior and neuroendocrine stress hormone activity in young children.41 The fear-anxiety system has a high degree of plasticity, and therefore changes with experience. This
system affects almost every organ in the body, including the
brain, and is triggered by stressors, which are external
threats.42 The social environment that exists in orphanages,
particularly in those in developing nations, typically contains
numerous stressors resulting from competition among children
for scarce resources. When stressors activate the fear-anxiety
system, bodily resources normally invested in processes supporting long-term survival, such as digestion, growth, and energy storage, are redirected to the immediate problem through
the metabolization of fats and proteins in an attempt to increase available energy. Although the activation of the fearanxiety system can be useful in coping with immediate stressors, prolonged suspension of future-oriented functions can
have significant consequences, particularly during children’s
development.43 One possible consequence of this extended activation is an increased risk for psychopathology. Research results demonstrate that clinical depression and post-traumatic
stress disorder are associated with disturbances in basal and
stress activity of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical
(“HPA”) system44 (the core of the mammalian stress system45).
28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 4 Side B

Tizard & Judith Rees, A Comparison of the Effects of Adoption, Restoration to the
Natural Mother, and Continued Institutionalization on the Cognitive Development
of Four-Year-Old Children, 45 CHILD DEV. 92, 92-99 (1974) [hereinafter Tizard &
Rees, Comparison]; René Spitz, Hospitalism—An Inquiry into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood, 1 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY CHILD 53, 53-74
(1945).
41 Megan R. Gunnar & Carol L. Cheatham, Brain and Behavior Interface:
Stress and the Developing Brain, 24 INFANT MENTAL HEALTH J. 195, 195211(2003).
42 Allan Munck, Paul M. Guyre & Nikki J. Holbrook, Physiological Functions
of Glucocorticoids in Stress and Their Relation to Pharmacological Actions, 5 ENDOCRINOLOGY REV. 25, 25-44 (1984).
43 Gunnar & Cheatham, supra note 41, at 200.
44 See Lotta Arboreliu et al., Increased Responsiveness of Presumed 5-HT Cells
to Citalopram in Adult Rats Subjected to Prolonged Maternal Separation Relative
to Brief Separation, 176 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 248-55 (2004).
45 See E. Ron De Kloet et al., Brain Corticosteroid Receptor Balance in Health
and Disease, 19 ENDOCRINOLOGY REV. 269, 269-301 (1998).
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Furthermore, research comparing glucocorticoid (“GC”) (steroid
hormones the HPA releases in response to stress) levels of children in a Romanian infant home to those of home-reared children found that the latter group exhibited normal GC circadian
rhythms, while not one member of the former group had a normal rhythm.46 Significantly, the atypical noon peak of GC
levels found in the institutionalized children was positively correlated with physical and developmental delays.47
In addition, growing up in an orphanage has been associated with attachment problems and poor-quality attachment relationships. Attachment disorders are particularly worrisome
psychological problems because they are known to prevent affected children from growing into capable and well-adjusted
adults.48 Attachments are patterns of interaction, or bonds,
that children have with their primary caregivers. Early attachments between children and caretakers are crucial to normative
development49 and these bonds are often correlated with stable
relationships throughout the lifetime.50 According to Attachment Theory, psycho-social bonds can take several forms:51 secure attachment, insecure avoidant attachment, and insecure
resistant attachment.52 Securely attached infants consider
their primary caregiver a safe base from which to explore the
world and are distressed when their caregiver is out of sight.
Insecure avoidant babies do not seek their primary caregiver
specifically and can be comforted by strangers, while insecure
resistant infants are ambivalent in their actions towards their
primary caregiver. A fourth attachment pattern, disorganized
attachment, was later developed to describe infants who behave
oddly and lack an organized strategy with respect to their at46 Mary Carlson & Felton Earls, Psychological and Neuroendocrinological Sequelae of Early Social Deprivation in Institutionalised Children in Romania, 807
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 419-428 (1997).
47 Id. at 423-24.
48 Dillon, supra note 14, at 237.
49 Tharp-Taylor, supra note 38, at 3.
50 Everett Waters et al., Attachment Security in Infancy and Early Adulthood:
A Twenty Year Longitudinal Study, 71 CHILD DEV. 684, 684-89 (2000).
51 MARY D. AINSWORTH ET AL., PATTERNS OF ATTACHMENT 1-29 (1978); 1 JOHN
BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS (1969).
52 See Mary D. Salter Ainsworth & Barbara A. Wittig, Attachment and the
Exploratory Behaviour of One-Year-Olds in a Strange Situation, in 4 DETERMINANTS OF INFANT BEHAVIOUR 113-136 (Brian M. Foss ed., 1969).
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tachment figure.53 This type of attachment is associated with
child maltreatment,54 maternal alcoholism and depression,55
high marital conflict,56 and prolonged or repeated separation
from the primary caregiver.57
The type of bonds between infants and their caregivers depends upon the degree to which the caregivers are sensitive and
responsive to infants’ needs and desires. A high level of sensitivity is associated with a secure attachment, and the latter
three patterns result from a lack or disruption of caregiving.
Since children living in orphanages are typically exposed to a
number of different caregivers and inconsistent or unresponsive
caregiving, it is difficult for them to form secure attachments to
one primary caregiver. The results are poor mental health consequences, undesirable behavioral outcomes,58 and delays in
cognitive and socio-emotional development.59 For example, in a
comparison of infants in residential care and infants in two-parent families who attended a day-care center with an environment similar to that of an orphanage, the institutionalized
children had a significantly higher rate of disorganized attachment patterns as compared to the control group.60 In another
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53 Mary Main & Judith Solomon, Procedures for Identifying Infants as Disorganized/Disoriented During the Strange Situation, in ATTACHMENT IN THE PRESCHOOL YEARS: THEORY, RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION 121-60 (Mark T. Greenberg
et al. eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1990).
54 Vicki Carlson et al., Disorganized/Disoriented Attachment Relationships in
Maltreated Infants, 25 DEV. PSYCHOL. 525, 525 (1989).
55 Elizabeth K. DeMulder & Marian Radke-Yarrow, Attachment with Affectively Ill and Well Mothers: Concurrent Behavioral Correlates, 3 Dev. & Psychopathology 227, 227-42 (1991).
56 Margaret Tresch Owen & Martha J. Cox, Marital Conflict and the Development of Infant-Parent Attachment Relationships, 11 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 152 (1997).
57 Theresa Jacobsen & Laura J. Miller, The Caregiving Contexts of Young
Children Who Have Been Removed from the Care of a Mentally Ill Mother: Relations to Mother-Child Attachment Quality, in ATTACHMENT DISORGANIZATION 34778 (Judith Solomon & Carol C. George eds., Guilford Press 1999).
58 E.g., Peter Fonagy & Mary Target, Attachment and Reflective Function:
Their Role in Self-Organization, 9 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 679, 679-700 (1997);
Peter Fonagy et al., Attachment, the Reflective Self, and Borderline States: The
Predictive Specificity of the Adult Attachment Interview and Pathological Emotional Development, in ATTACHMENT THEORY: SOCIAL, DEVELOPMENTAL AND
CLINICAL PERSPECTIVES 233-278 (Susan Goldberg et al. eds., Analytic Press 1995).
59 Tharp-Taylor, supra note 38, at 28, 30-31.
60 See Panayiota Vorria et al., Early Experiences and Attachment Relationships of Greek Infants Raised in Residential Group Care, 44 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY & ALLIED DISCIPLINES 1208 (2003).
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comparison study, the rate of secure attachments among
Romanian adoptees was lower than the normative rate, regardless of age at adoption or time spent in an orphanage.61 These
attachment difficulties are likely related to the high number of
caregivers children are exposed to while in an orphanage, high
staff turnover, and a lack of emotional involvement on the part
of the caregivers. In one study of high-quality orphanages, the
children had been exposed to an average of twenty-four different caregivers by the age of two and an average of fifty
caregivers by the age of four-and-a-half.62 In these same institutions, as is the case in many orphanages, close personal relationships were discouraged in order to avoid painful separations
for both the children and the staff. It is therefore not surprising
that the children reared in this environment had not formed
close attachments with any of the caregivers.63
Atypical behavior has also been identified among children
living in orphanages, including aggression, hyperactivity, attention-seeking, emotional withdrawal and inhibition, and indiscriminate friendliness. The severity of children’s conduct
problems has been found to be directly related to the level of
deprivation in their social environment.64 Furthermore, the
length of children’s institutionalization periods is positively correlated with the frequency of their conduct problems.65 In a research study comparing children who had been reared in
institutions until being placed in foster care at approximately
three years of age with children who had mainly lived with foster families, the researchers discovered that the former group
displayed more frequent problem behaviors than the latter
group, including restlessness, hyperactivity, aggression, and affective impoverishment.66 One possible explanation for the
problems identified among children living in orphanages is
that, although atypical for non-institutionalized children, they
61 Sharon Marcovitch et al., Determinants of Behavioural Problems in
Romanian Children Adopted in Ontario, 20 INT’L J. BEHAV. DEV. 17, 25 (1997).
62 E.g., Tizard & Rees, Institutional Rearing, supra note 40; Tizard & Rees,
Comparison, supra note 40, at 24.
63 Tizard & Rees, Institutional Rearing, supra note 40.
64 Tharp-Taylor, supra note 38, at 25-26.
65 Marcovitch et al., supra note 61.
66 William Goldfarb, The Effects of Early Institutional Care on Adolescent Personality, 14 CHILD DEV. 213, 222 (1943).
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are adaptive for the particular institutional context.67 Moreover, young, institutionalized children may learn these atypical
behaviors from their older peers after observing the latter
group’s effectiveness at getting its needs met.68
In addition to physical and socio-emotional problems, cognitive delays are commonly found among children who experience
institutional care.69 One research study found that six- and
seven-year-old orphans had lower IQ scores, lower levels of empathy, and were more likely to conform to adult opinions under
pressure than home-reared controls.70 Institutionalized children’s IQ scores tend to be both negatively correlated with duration of institutionalization and positively correlated with age at
institutionalization.71 One hypothesized reason for these deficits is that orphanages often restrict children’s play and exploration in order to avoid injury, since it is difficult for caregivers
to supervise multiple children at once.72 These restrictions,
however, can block children’s cognitive activity and
development.73
C. Arguments in Favor of and Against Intercountry Adoption

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 6 Side B

Opponents of intercountry adoption focus on cultural concerns, the interests of the sending countries, and the exploitative and unethical practices that tend to accompany the
international adoption process. They argue that international
adoptees lose their cultural and national identities when raised
outside of their birth countries by families who do not share the
children’s ethnicity and heritage.74 Though the difference between intercountry adoptees’ backgrounds and that of their
67

Tharp-Taylor, supra note 38, at 26.
Id.
69 JOHN BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH (World Health Org.
1951); René A. Spitz, The Role of Ecological Factors in Emotional Development in
Infancy, 20 CHILD DEV. 145 (1949); William Goldfarb, Effects of Psychological Deprivation in Infancy and Subsequent Stimulation, 102 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, 18, 18–33
(1945).
70 Vladimir M. Sloutsky, Institutional Care and Developmental Outcomes of 6and 7-year-old Children: A Contextualist Perspective, 20 INT’L J. BEHAV. DEV. 131,
131 (1997).
71 Id. at 141.
72 Id. at 149.
73 Id.
74 Hollinger, supra note 21, at 217.
68
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adoptive families is a legitimate issue of concern, it certainly
does not outweigh the benefit they receive from being adopted
into a loving home, where their physical and emotional needs
are met. “[I]n no sense could the right of a child to enjoy a particular culture be said to trump the more fundamental right to
be loved and protected as an individual.”75 There is also no scientific evidence demonstrating harm to adoptees or their adoptive families from a multicultural upbringing. In contrast,
there is a multitude of research finding that living in an orphanage has harmful effects upon children. Furthermore, there
is an abundance of resources, ranging from support groups to
educational tours of adoptees’ birth countries, available to address the complex issue of adoptees’ cultural identities.76
On a broader scale, opponents to intercountry adoption
often contend that the practice has negative consequences for
sending countries. Many political leaders and officials of sending nations argue that international adoption negatively affects
their country’s morale because it connotes a public admission
that its government cannot care for its own children.77 For example, unfavorable publicity about the large number of South
Korean babies “exported” to families in other countries
prompted the South Korean government to phase out its international adoption program due to embarrassment over its inability to care for parentless Korean children.78 As a result of
this attempt to eliminate foreign adoption, approximately
17,000 children are languishing in public orphanages throughout South Korea.79 In addition to embarrassment or shame,
sending countries often view intercountry adoption as a form of
imperialism on the part of receiving countries, which tend to be
wealthier and have a long history of exploiting sending coun75

Dillon, supra note 14, at 200.
Hollinger, supra note 21, at 217.
77 Lisa M. Katz, Comment, A Modest Proposal? The Convention on Protection
of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 9 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 283, 291 (1995) (citing MARY KATHLEEN BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION
120 (1976); Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Overview, in ADOPTION
LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.04 [1] (Joan Hollinger ed., 2002)).
78 Tamar Lewin, South Korea Slows Export of Babies for Adoption, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1990, at B10.
79 Crystal J. Gates, China’s Newly Enacted Intercountry Adoption Law:
Friend or Foe?, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 392 (1999).
76
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tries for natural resources and labor.80 In a continuation of developed nations’ exercise of power over developing nations, the
latter perceive the former as using international adoption as a
means of satisfying its own citizens’ desires for children while
simultaneously confirming sending countries’ inadequacy and
inferiority.81 Also, opponents argue that intercountry adoption
is simply used to treat symptoms of social and economic issues
in sending countries, and prevents these countries from having
to address the underlying problems that result in burgeoning
numbers of homeless children.82
Another argument opponents often assert is that international adoption is normally accompanied by illegal practices
such as baby-selling, kidnapping, and financial exploitation on
the part of adoption “facilitators.”83 Due to the high prices individuals and couples from developed countries are willing to pay
for a child, many are skeptical that even increased regulations
can eliminate the thriving black market for babies. This argument against intercountry adoption is flawed for two reasons:
first, it does not acknowledge that a dramatic decrease in the
supply of children, along with fewer choices for families desperate to adopt, will likely increase the financial incentives of illegal adoptions; second, it overlooks the possibility for creative
regulatory solutions to the problem of corruption in intercountry adoption that would allow the adoptive process to thrive
without being tainted by unethical and illegal practices. As to
the second point, this essay proposes the solution of an international adoption agency and family court to handle all intercountry adoptions efficiently and transparently, which would
markedly reduce the corruption problem.
80 Curtis Kleem, Airplane Trips and Organ Banks: Random Events and the
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoptions, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 319, 325
(2000).
81 Id. at 325-26 (citing John Triseliotis, Inter-country Adoption: In Whose Best
Interest?, in INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION: PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES 119, 131 (Michael
Humphrey & Heather Humphrey eds., 1993)); see also Jim L. Roby, Understanding Sending Country’s Policies in International Adoptions: Avoiding Legal and
Cultural Pitfalls, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 303, 316 (2004) (stating that some scholars
view intercountry adoptions as a form of economic exploitation that wealthy nations commit against poverty-stricken nations).
82 Bartholet, supra note 77.
83 Kleem, supra note 80.
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In contrast to opponents of intercountry adoption, supporters prioritize “the children, their individual situations, and
what is best for [the] . . . [children’s] needs.”84 Although the
issues that opponents of intercountry adoption assert, such as
national pride and cultural heritage, are important concerns,
they blanch in comparison to the sheer amount of suffering that
homeless and institutionalized children endure as a consequence of having their basic physical and emotional needs go
unmet. Opposing intercountry adoption in many cases is the
equivalent of condemning children without families to institutional life.85 Through intercountry adoption, children receive
inter alia, shelter, food, clothing, education, and affection,
which are often not adequately available in their home countries, particularly in institutional settings. As an additional
benefit, international adoption allows individuals and families
desiring a child to fill a void in their lives caused by an inability
to reproduce naturally. The intercountry adoption system, as
both supporters and opponents of the practice acknowledge, is
far from perfect. As such, there is much potential for improvement through the implementation of new regulations and
infrastructure.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION REGULATIONS

84
85

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 8 Side A

Currently, the governments of both sending and receiving
nations set intercountry adoption policies, which have resulted
in great variation among countries, despite the principles embodied in international agreements to which many such states
have become parties. One reason for this policy variation is
that the international treaties, though increasingly specific,
lengthy, and authoritative over the years, are still too vague to
produce standardized outcomes. In spite of significant progress
towards delineating explicit and cognizable procedures for intercountry adoptions, the current international regulations do
not provide sufficiently detailed procedures and, even more importantly, do not provide a mechanism for implementing the existing standards. The remainder of this section will cover the
Katz, supra note 77, at 292.
Dillon, supra note 14, at 198.
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A. Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child (1924)
The Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child, created
by the League of Nations in 1924, was the first attempt at an
international agreement addressing the special needs and vulnerabilities of children. The drafters did not intend for the
agreement to be binding upon states because they did not include any mechanisms for enforcement.86 This rather brief and
simple document entitles children to five rights, stated in general terms: the right to be provided with the physical and spiritual means for normal development, the right to adult help and
protection, the right to priority in the receipt of aid during times
of distress, the right to be put in a position to earn a livelihood
and to be protected from exploitation, and the right to be taught
the value of helping others.87 The text of the declaration that is
relevant to intercountry adoption states that “the orphan . . .
must be sheltered and succored.”88 Adoption into a loving
household satisfies this right, regardless of the adoptive family’s location, because it can rescue orphans from unhealthy environments and provide them with shelter and other
protections.
B. United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child
(1959)
28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 8 Side B

The UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child is a brief,
ten-principle resolution that the General Assembly (“GA”)
passed on November 20, 1959. It cites the Geneva Declaration
on the Rights of the Child for the principle that there is a need
to create special safeguards for children.89 The UN Declaration
sets forth general rights to which all children are entitled, including the right to free basic education, social security, and op86 Timothy John Fitzgibbon, Comment, The United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child: Are Children Really Protected? A Case Study of China’s Implementation, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 325, 329 (1998).
87 Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, League of Nations O.J. Spec.
Supp. 21, at 43 (1924).
88 Id.
89 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, GA Res. 1386 (XIV), 14th Sess.,
(Nov. 20, 1959).
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portunities “to enable [them] to develop physically, mentally,
morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity.”90 While not mentioning intercountry adoption explicitly, Principle 6
acknowledges a state’s responsibility to provide care to “children without a family and . . . adequate means of support.”91
Intercountry adoption is one of the means a state can utilize to
satisfy its responsibilities under Principle 6, particularly in
countries where the number of orphans and homeless children
far exceeds the amount of prospective domestic adoptive families and state resources.
C. The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law
and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoption (1965)

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 9 Side A

The Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and
Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoption of 1965 was the
first international effort to standardize intercountry adoption
procedures.92 The agreement allocates authority among the
states of the adopter and of the adoptee. The power to grant
adoptions is vested in the adopter’s state,93 while the adoptee’s
state has authority over “consents and consultations,” other
than those relating to the adopter and his family.94 Furthermore, both the adopter and adoptee’s states can annul or revoke
an adoption in accordance with their internal laws.95 However,
the Convention was a failed attempt to establish common procedures because it only had three signatories:96 Austria, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.97 Perhaps the Convention’s
vagueness led to its lack of acceptance. For example, it fails to
define “consent” and “abandonment” in relation to orphan sta90

Id.
Id.
92 Katz, supra note 77, at 288.
93 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions, art. 3, Nov. 15, 1965, 1107 U.N.T.S. 38.
94 Id. art. 5.
95 Id. art. 7.
96 JOHN MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS IN FAMILY LAW 185 (2005).
97 Jorge L. Carro, Regulation of Intercountry Adoption: Can the Abuses Come
to an End?, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 149 (1994).
91
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tus.98 Another issue could have been skepticism about whether
a unified jurisdictional scheme could actually be implemented.99 This concern likely stems in part from Article 15 of
the Convention since it allows contracting parties to disregard
the agreement when observance with its provisions would be
contrary to their public policy.100
D. European Convention on the Adoption of Children (1967)
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The European Convention on the Adoption of Children
(“European Convention”) is a regional agreement that the
Council of Europe developed to set uniform rules for adoption.
States that are not members of the Council of Europe may be
invited to become parties to the European Convention,101
though there are no non-members among the eighteen states
that ratified or acceded to the treaty.102 The majority of the text
refers to adoption in general, with only two articles specifically
applying to intercountry adoption: Article 11, which addresses
nationality differences between children and adoptive parents,
and Article 14 which deals with the communication of adoption
information among the competent authorities of different nations when children and prospective adoptive parents do not
live in the same state.103 However, the treaty appears more
favorable towards intercountry adoption when compared to various other international agreements that contain a presumption in favor of domestic adoption because the European
Convention does not include such a bias. More generally, the
treaty is pro-adoption because it includes a prohibition on restricting the number of children that any one person or family
98 Howard E. Bogard, Comment, Who Are the Orphans? Defining Orphan Status and the Need for an International Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 571, 592 (1991).
99 Id.
100 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to Adoptions, supra note 93, art. 15.
101 European Convention on the Adoption of Children, art. 22, Apr. 24, 1967,
E.T.S. No. 58, 7 I.L.M. 211.
102 Council of Europe, European Convention on the Adoption of Children, Status as of May 26, 2008, http://conventions.coe.int.
103 European Convention on the Adoption of Children, supra note 101, arts. 11,
14.
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can adopt, regardless of the capacity to have biological
children.104
The European Convention is paradoxically progressive and
antiquated at the same time. It is a pioneer in listing specific
inquiry requirements for the adoption process. Unlike previous
instruments, it considers the “child’s viewpoint with respect to
the proposed adoption,”105 but it is notably traditional in its assertion that state laws may require biological parents to provide
a dowry for the child.106 Despite this questionable latter provision and its relatively narrow reach (only European nations are
signatories),107 the European Convention represents progress
towards providing more protections for internationally-adopted
children, particularly because of the requirement that states investigate the abilities and characteristics of prospective adopters along with the children’s viewpoint about the adoption. By
providing for specific enquiry prerequisites to the approval of
adoptions, children are less likely to be subject to exploitation
and abuse and are more likely to be compatible with their adoptive families.
E. Inter-American Convention on the Conflict of Laws
Concerning the Adoption of Minors (1984)
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The Inter-American Convention on the Conflict of Laws
Concerning the Adoption of Minors (“Inter-American Convention”) is a regional treaty primarily stating whether the law of
the sending or receiving country governs different parts of the
international adoption process.108 Twelve countries in the
Western hemisphere signed the agreement, but only half of
them ratified it.109 Though conflict of laws is the treaty’s main
focus, it nonetheless provides various substantive protections to
adoptees. For example, Article 8 allows national adoption au104

Id. art. 12.
Id. art. 9(1)(f).
106 Id. art. 10(2).
107 Council of Europe, supra note 102, pmbl.
108 Inter-American Convention on Conflicts of Laws Concerning the Adoption
of Minors art. 3, May 24, 1984, O.A.S.T.S. No. 62, 24 I.L.M. 460.
109 Inter-American Convention on Conflicts of Laws Concerning the Adoption
of Minors Reservations, May 24, 1984, O.A.S.T.S. No. 62, 24 I.L.M. 460, available
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-48.html [hereinafter Inter-American
Convention Reservation].
105
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thorities to require a prospective adopter “to provide evidence of
his physical, moral, psychological and economic capacity,
through public or private institutions,” with the express purpose of protecting minors.110 Furthermore, states must interpret the Convention in favor of children’s best interests
pursuant to Article 19, and Article 13 requires adoptees’ consent to convert a simple adoption into “full adoption, adoptive
legitimation, or similar institutions,” provided they are above
the age of fourteen.111 Analogous to the European Convention,
the Inter-American Convention allows for states that are not
OAS members to become parties to the treaty (Article 23).
However, to date none have done so.112
F. UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating
to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption
Nationally and Internationally (1986)
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The UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and
Internationally (“UN Declaration on Adoption”) is a global attempt to protect “the large number of children who are abandoned or become orphans.”113 The resolution recalls the UN
Declaration on the Rights of the Child and reaffirms its assertion that children’s natural parents should raise them whenever possible, but even if this is not possible, all children should
be raised in an emotionally, morally, and materially secure environment. Articles 17 to 24 specifically address intercountry
adoption, with Article 17 embodying a preference for placement
in a domestic foster or adoptive family over a foreign one.114 It
is strange that the UN favors a temporary foster situation for
homeless and orphaned children in this Declaration over a per110 Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the Adoption of
Minors, supra note 108, art. 8.
111 Id. arts. 13, 19.
112 Id. art. 23; Inter-American Convention Reservation, supra note 109.
113 Declaration of Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and
Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85/Annex (Dec. 3, 1986).
114 Id. arts. 17-24.
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manent, stable adoption simply because the latter is in a different country. Although it is ideal for a child to have continuity
in his cultural environment, he would likely benefit more from
gaining a permanent family through intercountry adoption
than from having his attachments interrupted at the end of the
foster period in his birth country.
The UN Declaration on Adoption addresses important issues such as child safety, corruption, and consent, but only calls
for rules without fully defining these issues or identifying specific solutions. For example, Article 21 states, “[i]n intercountry
adoption through persons acting as agents for prospective adoptive parents, special precautions should be taken in order to
protect the child’s legal and social interests.”115 The Declaration neither defines the pertinent legal and social interests nor
identifies any “special precautions” that can be taken to protect
them. Another example of the Declaration’s lack of specificity is
Article 20, which prohibits intercountry adoption placements
from resulting in “improper financial gain,” without distinguishing between legitimate costs and reasonable fee amounts
in the intercountry adoption process and those that are unacceptable. Overall, the UN Declaration on Adoption usefully
highlights significant issues in intercountry adoption, but fails
to take any meaningful steps towards improving them.
G. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 11 Side A

The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 cites
previous international agreements on children’s rights in recognizing that the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child
and the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child stated “the
need to extend particular care to the child.”116 As the first Convention relating to intercountry adoption, it presumptively carries more weight than the previous UN instruments which were
mere declarations. In other words, the previous instruments
simply declared existing law and did not have the legal status of

115

Id. art. 21.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).
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a treaty,117 in contrast with conventions, which have the characteristics of treaties.118 However, in practice, neither the UN
Conventions nor Declarations relating to intercountry adoption
are binding law because the GA promulgated them, and according to Article 10 of the UN Charter, GA resolutions are only
“recommendations.”119 Yet, a country can bind itself to UN
Conventions if it signs and ratifies them in its domestic legal
system.120
Article 21(b)-(e) of the UN Convention sets forth several basic guidelines for intercountry adoption. Article 21(b) identifies
intercountry adoption as an acceptable form of caring for children, but asserts that it should only be utilized if they cannot be
suitably cared for in their birth countries.121 This is a somewhat negative approach to international adoption because the
Convention treats it as a last resort, particularly when taken in
context with the Article 20(3) requirement that states pay “due
regard” to the “desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing
and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.”122 Moreover, since there is no provision requiring the
available options in a particular case to be weighed against one
another, a child could end up with much lower-quality care than
would have been provided to him outside of his birth country.
Thus, while continuity in ethnic and cultural environment is
important, the presumption in favor of a child’s birth nation
could result in a child growing up in an institution rather than
in a stable family setting, which is a situation that would not
best serve the child’s interests. Accordingly, this result may violate both the Article 21 preamble, which states that the adoption system “shall ensure that the best interests of the child
shall be the paramount consideration,” and the Article 3(1)
mandate that all actions concerning children should have “the
117 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/44/25/Annex (Nov. 20, 1989), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945-1995 232 (Irving Sarnoff ed., 1997).
118 Id.
119 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS, 44 (2001); INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945-1995 xvi (Irving Sarnoff ed.,
1997).
120 United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty Reference Guide, http://untreaty.
un.org/English/guide.asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
121 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 116, art 21(b).
122 Id. art. 20(3).
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best interests of the child” as “a primary consideration.”123 Furthermore, the UN Convention’s preference for national solutions over intercountry adoption burdens sending countries
with the onerous task of reforming their domestic adoption and
orphanage systems, which is beyond the capabilities of most developing nations.124 Even if states are capable of accomplishing
this task, they have little incentive to do so in light of crossborder adoption’s profitability.125
Article 21(c) underscores the importance of ensuring that
the quality of care children receive within foreign families is
sufficiently high and aims to protect children against exploitation in the intercountry adoption process. The Article states
that a child adopted internationally must be provided with
“safeguards and standards equivalent to those existing in the
case of national adoption,”126 which would actually only have a
beneficial effect if the standards and protections that apply to
domestic adoptions are adequate. For example, provision 21(c)
does not help internationally-adopted children from countries
with national adoption systems that are rife with corruption
and inefficiency. A better way for the UN to have ensured that
the intercountry adoption process embodied strong safeguards
and high standards for children would be to have articulated
precisely what those safeguards and standards should entail,
rather than simply linking them to a nation’s domestic adoption
system.
Importantly, Article 21(d) addresses the problem of corruption in the intercountry adoption process by maintaining that
states must take all appropriate measures to ensure that placing children through intercountry adoption “does not result in
improper financial gain” for the parties involved.127 Akin to the
UN Declaration on Adoption, the Convention does not define
the types or amounts of financial gain that would be considered
“improper.” This notion is relevant because even good-faith intercountry adoptions typically implicate large sums for administrative, and legal work, and travel.
Id. arts. 3(1), 21.
Kapstein, supra note 1, at 121.
Id.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 116, art. 21.
Id.
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The final provision under Article 21 is administrative in nature and encourages states to enter into agreements with each
other to facilitate compliance with the other sections of the Article.128 Although far from comprehensive, the Convention does
set forth important principles for protecting children in the intercountry adoption process. The instrument was widely
adopted, and interestingly, the U.S. and Somalia are the only
nations that have not ratified it.129
H. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(1990)

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 12 Side B

In 1990, the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) developed the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
(“African Charter”), which is a regional instrument that entered
into force in 1999.130 Currently, twenty-one African nations
have ratified the document.131 The African Charter takes a
somewhat unfavorable approach to intercountry adoption because Article 24 only allows its use as a last resort, specifically,
in situations where children cannot be placed in foster or adoptive homes in their birth countries.132 Although the African
Charter also limits intercountry adoptions to nations which
have ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the
Child or the African Charter,133 most countries have in fact
signed onto the former.134 However, the U.S., a major receiving
country, is not a party to either instrument, which could deprive
African orphans of the opportunity for a loving home that the
U.S. would otherwise provide.135
128

Id.
Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construction and Application of the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 28 I.L.M. 1148 (1989) – Global
Cases and Administrative Decisions, 20 A.L.R. FED.2D 95 (2007).
130 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49.
131 University of Minnesota, Human Rights Library, African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into
force Nov. 29, 1999, ratification information, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/afchildratifications.html (last visited May 12, 2008).
132 Id. art. 24.
133 Id.
134 Kemper, supra note 129.
135 Id.; Speak Africa, Status of Ratification of the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, http://www.speakafrica.org/status_ratification_af129
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The African Charter prioritizes the best interests of children.136 However, as is the case with other international instruments, the African Charter does not define the term “best
interests.” Also notable is the requirement that the judicial and
administrative proceedings consider views of children who are
capable of expressing themselves.137 This is a progressive feature of the African Charter because, unlike various other instruments, children are empowered with influence over their
own fate.
I. Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (1993)
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Convention”) of 1993 is a multilateral treaty that sets a framework for
norms and procedures governing intercountry adoptions.138 Its
purpose is to unify the diverse adoption procedures across the
globe139 and safeguard children’s fundamental rights, including
protection from child abduction, sale, and trafficking.140 The
Hague Convention governs all intercountry adoptions between
the seventy-six nations141 that are signatories, regardless of
whether public or private agencies or individuals facilitate the
adoptions. The agreement promotes international adoption for
abandoned children whose domestic placement options have
28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 13 Side A

rican_charter_rights_and_welfare_child (last visited Mar. 8, 2009); University of
Minnesota, supra note 131.
136 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, supra note 130, art.
4.
137 Id.
138 Peter H. Pfund, Introductory Note to Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including the Convention on Protection
of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 32 I.L.M. 1134,
1134 (1993).
139 JEREMY ROSENBLATT, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AFFECTING CHILDREN
87 (2000).
140 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption art. 1, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167.
141 The World Organization for Cross-border Co-operation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table,
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69#nonmem (last visited May 12, 2008).
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been exhausted.142 A key feature of the Hague Convention is
the requirement that each state designate a Central Authority
(CA) to implement the agreement’s directives, oversee the aspects of the intercountry adoption process occurring within its
borders, and communicate with CA’s of other states when facilitating the intercountry adoption process and furthering the
treaty’s objectives.143
The Hague Convention is much more specific and comprehensive in its approach to intercountry adoption than earlier
germane agreements. This signals progress towards guaranteeing all internationally adopted children minimum standards of
care and safeguards. For example, the Hague Convention specifies procedural steps in the intercountry adoption process,
down to the content of reports that the sending and receiving
countries compile and exchange.144 This procedural framework
sets the Hague Convention apart from previous instruments,
which simply stated rights or goals without specifying the
means by which to accomplish them.
The Hague Convention also tackles the problem of corruption in intercountry adoption more comprehensively than previous global instruments. First, the Hague Convention corrects
the ambiguity of the term “improper financial gain” in Article
21(d) of the UN Convention by clarifying that reasonable professional fees and reasonable remuneration to the directors, administrators, and employees of bodies involved in an adoption
do not constitute “improper financial or other gain.”145 Second,
the Hague Convention addresses the problem of corruption associated with consent in the intercountry adoption process.146
Article 4 states that the consent of the necessary “persons, institutions and authorities,” as well as that of the children (with
regard to their “age and degree of maturity”), shall not be “induced by payment or compensation of any kind.”147
142

Marx, supra note 17, at 388.
Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, supra note 140, arts. 6, 14-20; Kapstein, supra note 1, at
123.
144 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, supra note 140, art. 15.
145 Id. art. 32.
146 Id. art. 4.
147 Id.
143
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Another progressive feature of the Hague Convention is
that it specifically takes children’s preferences into account.
The instrument does this in two places, noting the importance
of first considering the children’s age and maturity in both: in
Article 4, concerning consent to the adoption in the first place;
and in Article 21, regarding consent to alternative arrangements when a CA determines that the continued placement of
children with prospective adoptive parents is not in the children’s best interests.
Despite the progress it embodies, the Hague Convention
has been the subject of great criticism. One major problem is
that its requirements are too costly for poor and developing
countries to implement. Specifically, these countries are unable
to handle the administrative burdens associated with the
Hague Convention’s implementation requirements because
many lack monetary resources and a functioning government
bureaucracy.148 This is a serious issue because poor and developing nations tend to have both the highest number of orphans
and the greatest amount of corruption.149 The circumstances in
these nations tend to result in one or both of the following consequences: many unregulated adoptions, corruption, and exploitation of children and families for profit; or a great number
of children in limbo without families due to the time it takes the
small number of officials that a poor country can afford to oversee numerous adoption cases. Clearly, neither state of affairs
serves the best interests of children. For example, Guatemala
switched from the former situation to the latter in recent
years.150 Prior to governmental regulation, intercountry adoptions amounted to a $100 million-a-year business for Guatemalan notaries, who charged an average of $30,000 per child.151
Recently, however, Guatemala agreed to abide by the Hague
Convention. As a result, the number of intercountry adoptions
148

Dillon, supra note 14, at 239.
See Lindsay K. Carlberg, Note, The Agreement Between the United States
and Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children: A More Effective
and Efficient Solution to the Implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption or Just Another Road to Nowhere Paved with Good Intentions?, 17 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 147 (2007).
150 Olga R. Rodriguez, New Rules Slow Adoptions from Guatemala: A Crackdown on the System Has Americans Wondering Whether They Can Get Kids, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2007, at A30.
151 Id.
149
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from Guatemala will decrease because the government does not
possess the resources to handle the great amount of cases that
the notary industry had managed. In addition, the treaty’s requirements for inspection of each adoption case take time and
effort.152 The Guatemalan government only has seven inspectors who not only handle adoption approvals, but also deal with
family issues such as domestic violence and child neglect.153
In addition to Guatemala, Ethiopia is an impoverished
country that has been popular among Americans seeking to
adopt in recent years. Like Guatemala, it has extremely limited
resources to monitor intercountry adoptions.154 The nation’s
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, which oversees adoptions, expressed its prediction that it does not have the resources to
manage the increasing amount of adoption requests.155
As highlighted in the Guatemala and Ethiopia examples,
the Hague Convention actually places heavier burdens upon
impoverished sending states than upon receiving states, which
tend to be wealthier in comparison. The Convention requires
the former to regulate the process of matching children with
adoptive parents, protect the rights of the children and their
biological parents, investigate ways for children to remain in
their birth countries, and combat illegal adoption practices.156
In light of the burden the Hague Convention places upon impoverished nations, financial and institutional barriers make it difficult for the instrument to solve the problems it was developed
to address.
A second major criticism of the Hague Convention is the
lack of an international supervisory body to ensure the compliance of contracting states.157 The agreement leaves enforcement to each nation’s CA, yet each country has the sole
152

Id.
Id.
154 Jane Gross & Will Connors, Ethiopia Ranks 5th for U.S. Adoptions: Some
Say the Nation’s Process is Faster, Has Fewer Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007,
at A19.
155 Id.
156 Kimberly A. Chadwick, Comment, The Politics and Economics of Intercountry Adoption in Eastern Europe, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 113, 140 (1999) (citing
ELIEZER D. JAFFE, INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTIONS: LAWS AND PERSPECTIVES OF “SENDING” COUNTRIES 218 (1995)).
157 Kleem, supra note 80, at 319-48.
153
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authority to accredit its CA.158 As a result, the system under
the Hague Convention allows each country to police its own intercountry adoptions, as was the case prior to the treaty.159
Therefore, it is doubtful that the parties to the treaty are fully
compliant with the Convention, particularly since the lack of
regulation and consequences for violations provide little motivation for them to do so.
A third issue is the Hague Convention’s silence and lack of
specificity with respect to important aspects of intercountry
adoption. For example, the Convention does not specify characteristics that potential adopters must possess in order to qualify
for intercountry adoption. Furthermore, the Convention fails to
define criteria for determining the “best interests of the child,” a
phrase that appears numerous times in the treaty. In light of
these criticisms, the Hague Convention is merely a small step
towards an intercountry adoption regime that truly protects the
best interests of children. As can be seen in the following section, a great deal of reform and infrastructure is needed to address the numerous, complex problems that plague the current
system governing intercountry adoptions.
III. PROBLEMS

CURRENT INTERCOUNTRY
ADOPTION SYSTEM

WITH THE

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 15 Side A

The current intercountry adoption process is extraordinarily complex, time-consuming, and entails great personal and
financial costs to parents seeking to adopt.160 Furthermore, it
has proven itself prone to corruption and inefficiency partially
because prospective parents must rely on domestic and foreign
agencies, lawyers, and facilitators whose competence and trustworthiness may not be ascertainable and who have generally
been able to shield themselves from liability.161 The process of
adopting internationally is also becoming increasingly difficult
as sender country regulations tighten and the costs of adoption
rise.162 Ethiopia is one of the new preferred countries for adop158

Id. at 334.
Id. at 334-39.
160 Hollinger, supra note 21, at 215.
161 Id. at 216.
162 Bart Eisenberg, Road to Foreign Adoptions Gets Rockier: Tighter Regulations, Rising Costs, and Changing Attitudes Increase Hurdles for Those Seeking
Children from Other Lands Family, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 28, 1990, at 13.
159
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tion, partially because of its relatively cheap adoption cost of
$20,000, which is affordable compared to the prices of adopting
from other nations.163 The numerous problems in the current
intercountry adoption system present seemingly insurmountable obstacles to fulfilling the best interests of the world’s homeless and orphaned children.
A. Discrimination in International Adoption

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 15 Side B

Many high-quality families desiring to adopt are currently
precluded from doing so due to the prohibitively high costs of
intercountry adoption. The average cost of adopting an infant
from another country ranges from $18,000 to $30,000 in initial
fees, excluding other costs such as travel and medical expenses.164 The money is usually paid to “intermediaries, lawyers, facilitators, bureaucrats, notaries, nondescript officials of
all kinds, and the natural mother.”165 Another issue is the common requirement that parents seeking to adopt internationally
spend a significant amount of time in the foreign country from
which they wish to adopt. This requirement is not only expensive, but may also be impracticable since many individuals have
job obligations that preclude long-term travel. Despite deferral
tax credits of approximately $10,000 per intercountry adoption,
the costs, which not only include agency and administrative
fees, but also home studies, background investigations, and
travel, continue to block middle- and lower-income families
from adopting internationally.166
B. Inefficiency
Intercountry adoption is a very lengthy and often frustrating process. Inefficiency is one of the reasons for the considerable amount of time the process entails. Usually, the adoption
process requires extremely lengthy waiting periods.167 Moreo163

Gross & Connors, supra note 154.
Letter from Jeanne Ketola, Executive Director, Special Connections International, to the U.S. Dep’t of State, Adoption Regulation Docket Room (Feb. 24,
2005), available at http://travel.state.gov/family/adopt_comments/word/special_
connections_international_comments.doc.
165 Anthony D’Amato, Cross-Country Adoption: A Call to Action, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1239, 1246 (1998).
166 Hollinger, supra note 21, at 218.
167 Marx, supra note 17, at 380.
164

30

C M
Y K

04/13/2010 15:24:25

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/1

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 16 Side A

04/13/2010 15:24:25

\\server05\productn\P\PIR\22-1\PIR101.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 31

INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION POLICY

13-APR-10

14:08

31

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 16 Side A

ver, various sending nations require one or both prospective
adoptive parents to reside in their countries for an allotted period of time before allowing the adoption.168 Correspondingly, a
great deal of the inefficiency in the intercountry adoption process can be attributed to the many, often duplicative, requirements of both the sending and receiving countries. For
example, Americans who have adopted children abroad must
also complete the requisite U.S. adoption process because foreign adoption decrees are not entitled to the same “full faith and
credit” as American decrees are, and a U.S. adoption decree is
generally required in order to obtain a U.S. birth certificate.169
Sending countries with duplicative requirements include Vietnam, Russia, and Bulgaria, which require prospective adoptive
parents to travel to their country on two separate occasions as a
prerequisite to adopting one of their orphans.170
Moreover, conflicts between the laws of sending and receiving countries can cause lengthy delays and, at times, render the
attempted adoption impossible. This problem commonly occurs
when the receiving nation has stricter adoption eligibility standards than the sending country.171 Even in the absence of conflicting adoption laws, the average waiting time for
intercountry adoptions stills averages between one and three
years.172 During the period when adoptions are pending approval, children miss out on the opportunity to form secure attachments with caregivers at an earlier age, arguably resulting
in long-term negative consequences for the children’s
development.
C. Corruption
Another major problem with the current international
adoption system is widespread corruption. “Baby-selling,”
168

Hubing, supra note 5, at 685.
Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and
Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 181, 189 (1996).
170 Jeff D. Opdyke, Adoption’s New Geography —- Changes in Global Rules
Make Process Even Tougher, Costlier; Bolivia, Brazil May Open Up, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 14, 2003, at D1.
171 Stacie I. Strong, Children’s Rights in Intercountry Adoption: Towards a
New Goal, 13 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163, 174-75 (1995).
172 Adoption Online, Adoption Education Center, Intercountry Adoption, http:/
/www.adoptiononline.com/aecintercountry.cfm (last visited May 16, 2008).
169
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“baby-snatching” (child abduction), child trafficking, and bribery are very common corruption schemes under the existing intercountry adoption regime.173 As the price of intercountry
adoption rises, so does the economic incentive for theft and
other forms of corruption.174 Child traffickers typically earn between $5000 and $25,000 per infant,175 which is a high enough
incentive to foster a black market for babies even where moderate regulations do exist. This type of corruption has been uncovered in many developing countries. For instance, a 1996
investigation into Paraguayan adoption procedures suggested
that many of the country’s infants that foreigners adopted were
either sold or stolen.176 Another example is a child trafficking
ring in China that was uncovered in 2005, which had abducted
or purchased approximately one thousand children.177 The
traffickers had sold the babies to Chinese orphanages for
amounts ranging from $400 to $538 per child. In turn, the
purchasing orphanages placed most of the children with foreign
families in exchange for mandatory contributions of $3000 per
child.178 In February 2006, nine individuals in China were convicted of trafficking and twenty-three local government officials
were fired for their involvement.179
Furthermore, sending countries’ agencies, officials, and citizens are not the only parties that have been accused of running
corrupt intercountry adoption schemes. Rather, individuals
from receiving countries have also been involved in corrupt
practices. For example, a child trafficking enterprise was discovered in Cambodia in 2002.180 Two American owners of a
U.S. adoption agency had led the enterprise through which they
173 Marx, supra note 17, at 378 (citing Curtis Kleem, Note, Airplane Trips and
Organ Banks: Random Events and the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 319, 325 (2000)).
174 D’Amato, supra note 165, at 1247.
175 Kapstein, supra note 1, at 119.
176 Diana Jean Schemo, The Baby Trail: A Special Report; Adoptions in Paraguay: Mothers Cry Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1996, at 1.
177 Peter S. Goodman, Stealing Babies for Adoption; With U.S. Couples Eager
to Adopt, Some Infants Are Abducted and Sold in China, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2006, at A01.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Trish Maskew, Child Trafficking and Intercountry Adoption: The
Cambodian Experience, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 619, 632 (2004-05).
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collected approximately eight million dollars from American
adoptive parents.181 In this scheme, Cambodian children were
taken from their birth parents under false pretenses. Many
parents were told that they could have their children back at
any time, that they would be sent money and photos of their
children for the rest of their lives or that, upon reaching the age
of maturity, their children could petition for them to immigrate
to the U.S.182 The two Americans leading the enterprise were
prosecuted for conspiracy to commit visa fraud, conspiracy to
launder money, and structuring.183 However, these individuals
were not charged for child trafficking in the U.S. because U.S.
law does not prohibit child trafficking for the purposes of
adoption.184
In cases where biological parents have sold their infant to a
child trafficker, they usually only receive a tiny fraction of the
price that the adoptive parents pay. Nonetheless, this amount
serves as an adequate baby-selling motivator for desperate parents in impoverished countries. For example, a baby-selling
racket in a poor Indian village involved women who sold their
infant daughters for approximately $20 per child because female children were less useful to Indian families in comparison
to male children.185 Similarly, the child trafficking enterprise
uncovered in Cambodia paid birth parents between $20 and
$200 per child along with a fifty-kilogram bag of rice.186 These
prices amount to just a small percentage of the adoption fees
that adoptive parents in receiving countries are willing to pay.
Due to the large returns associated with illegal “baby-selling,”
there is great motivation for individuals to participate in this
black market despite the risks of prosecution.
As a result of corruption problems, seventeen of the forty
sending countries from which Americans adopt have instituted
181

Id. at 633.
Id. at 633-34.
183 Structuring is the organization of transactions in a manner that will illegally avoid government-mandated reporting and record-keeping requirements,
such as dividing large transactions into smaller ones to avoid regulator scrutiny.
Id. at 632-33.
184 Id. at 634.
185 Raymond Bonner, For Poor Families, Selling Baby Girls Was Economic
Boon, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2003, at A3.
186 Maskew, supra note 180, at 634.
182
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temporary or permanent moratoriums on private adoptions of
their orphans,187 leaving many children to languish in institutions.188 For instance, the Romanian government declared an
official moratorium on intercountry adoption in June 2001189 in
response to EU concerns over corruption and child trafficking.190 The Romanian freeze on international adoptions was
made retroactive to December 1, 2000, abruptly ending international adoptions planned during this time, despite the fact that
many children had already established contacts with families
seeking to adopt them.191 The moratorium was replaced on
January 1, 2005192 with Law 272, which essentially forbids intercountry adoptions of Romanian children.193 Specifically, the
only foreigners that the law allows to adopt Romanian children
are their biological grandparents, and even this is not permitted
until every attempt to reunite children with their families or
place them with another Romanian family has been made and
has failed.194 Furthermore, the law prohibits all intercountry
adoptions of children under the age of two.195 As a result, the
vast majority of the 10,000 Romanian children abandoned in
hospitals annually196 and approximately 40,000 orphans in the
country197 are not eligible for the opportunity to have stable
family lives through intercountry adoption. According to an investigation recently conducted by Mental Disability Rights International, many unadopted orphans are left to suffer
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187 Pamela Anne Quiroz, Color-blind Individualism, Intercountry Adoption
and Public Policy, 34 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 57, 62 (2007).
188 Gates, supra note 79, at 369-70.
189 MEPs Call for International Adoptions from Romania, U.S. FED. NEWS,
July 11, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 12001941.
190 World Briefing Europe: Romania: Closing the Door on Foreign Adoptions,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2006, at A6; World Briefing Europe: Romania: Adoption Dispute with Europeans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at A6.
191 MEPs Call for International Adoptions from Romania, supra note 189.
192 Id.
193 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Law Backfires, Stranding Orphans in Romania, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2005, at A6.
194 Romania Implements Law Restricting International Adoptions, SE. EUR.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, available at http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_
%20GB/features/setimes/features/2005/01/04/feature-01; Romania Curbs Foreign
Adoptions, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3810425.
stm.
195 Romania Implements Law, supra note 194.
196 Rosenthal, supra note 193.
197 Romania Implements Law, supra note 194.
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indefinitely in government-run institutions,198 where the staff
commonly abuse and neglect them.199
Like Romania, Georgia instituted a moratorium on foreign
adoptions that resulted in dire consequences. The Georgian
President declared an adoption freeze in January 1997200 both
for reasons of nationalism201 and suspected corruption in the
intercountry adoption process.202 As a consequence of this policy, several orphans who had been approved for international
adoption prior to the moratorium died of otherwise treatable illnesses while enduring miserable conditions in Georgian
orphanages.203
In addition to moratoriums on the part of various sending
nations, the U.S. has also responded to corruption problems in
intercountry adoption by suspending the process with respect to
certain countries. In December 2002, the U.S. instituted the
aforementioned ban on visas for Cambodian children that
Americans were seeking to adopt due to suspicions of child trafficking.204 Similarly, the U.S. State Department has refused to
process new adoptions from Guatemala as of April 1, 2008 because this sending country has not yet implemented all of the
safeguards required under the Hague Convention.205
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Rosenthal, supra note 193.
Craig S. Smith, Romania’s Orphans Face Widespread Abuse, Group Says,
N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2006, at A3.
200 Tyler Marshall, U.S. Presses Georgia to Send Orphans, L.A. TIMES, July 18,
1997, at A4.
201 Alessandra Stanley, A Baby’s Death in Georgia Revives Fight Over Foreign
Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1997, at 4 [hereinafter Stanley, A Baby’s Death];
Alessandra Stanley, Hands Off Our Babies, A Georgian Tells America, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 1997, at 1 [hereinafter Stanley, Hands Off].
202 Alessandra Stanley, Issue of Foreign Adoption Follows Shevardnadze to
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1997, at A5 [hereinafter Stanley, Issue of Foreign
Adoption]; Stanley, Hands Off, supra note 201, at 11.
203 Stanley, A Baby’s Death, supra note 201, at 14; News Summary, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 1997, at A2.
204 Gina Barton, Many Families in Limbo After U.S. Halts Cambodian Adoptions, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 4, 2002.
205 Citizenship and Immigration Services Announces Changes to Guatemala
Adoptions, U.S. FED. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 8858995.
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D. Wide Degree of Variation in Adoption Laws Amongst
Nations
The adoption laws of different sending countries vary
widely, and as a result, some intercountry adoptions can be
completed in the sending country while others must be completed in the receiving country.206 The complexities of deciphering the varying procedural requirements for different
countries result in factors such as cost and convenience driving
the location of international adoptions rather than considerations such as the sending country’s resource level and the need
for adoptive parents. For example, before its government recently intervened, Guatemala had a largely unregulated system
that allowed for relatively quick adoptions usually finalized
within nine months.207 When a country offers a reduced waiting time, the number of intercountry adoptions from that nation
will likely skyrocket, while other nations with fewer resources
and a greater number of children living in orphanages will experience lower interest in their adoptable orphans from prospective foreign adopters as a result.
E. Lack of Enforcement of Current Regulations

206
207
208
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Achieving compliance with international law is a substantial challenge because of the lack of enforcement authority and
appropriate enforcement mechanisms.208 Since the GA does not
have the ability to create binding law, its resolutions providing
for child protections in intercountry adoption are little more
than gestures with questionable impacts in practice because
there is no authoritative basis upon which to prevent countries
from violating them. Even when international agreements attempt to create accountability, enforcement is difficult to
achieve. For instance, the Hague Convention requires its signatories to identify CAs that are responsible for implementing the
Convention’s regulations. However, enforcement of the CA’s
duties is nearly impossible in poor nations where the CA’s resources are typically scarce and the CA was the often ineffective
Hollinger, supra note 21, at 217.
Rodriguez, supra note 150.
Hubing, supra note 5, at 679.
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body in charge of overseeing international adoptions in the first
place, prior to the Hague Convention.
In addition, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) is the
UN’s principal judicial organ, but only states, not private parties, have standing before this court.209 Therefore, families involved in intercountry adoption disputes cannot seek relief
through the ICJ, even against nations that violate treaties that
they have ratified. Even in the improbable event that a state
chooses to represent a private party against another state, the
latter state must consent to the ICJ’s jurisdiction in order for
the case to be heard. This consent is unlikely because states
tend to prefer to settle disputes through diplomatic means
rather than more formally through the ICJ.210
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: INTERNATIONAL AGENCY &
INTERNATIONAL FAMILY COURT
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Although the international attempts at establishing rights
for abandoned or orphaned children and promoting intercountry adoption are laudable, they are still insufficient. Greater
measures are needed to combat the corruption, discrimination,
and inefficiencies that pervade the current international adoption system. Although the Hague Convention represents progress for child protections in intercountry adoption, it lacks the
infrastructure for implementing the Convention’s directives,
particularly for poor and less-developed nations. The pervasive
problems present in intercountry adoption today, thirteen years
after the Convention entered into force,211 are evidence that additional mechanisms are needed to monitor and facilitate the
intercountry adoption process.
A solution to the problems of the current intercountry adoption system would be the creation of an international agency on
intercountry adoption and an international family court. The
international agency would be much more than a global surveillance body; it would be the sole coordinator of international
adoptions. The agency would be responsible for handling appli209

Id.
Hubing, supra note 5, at 679 (citing LINDA MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE PROFESSOR SERIES 110 (1998)).
211 The World Organization for Cross-border Co-operation in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra note 141.
210

C M
Y K

04/13/2010 15:24:25

37

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 19 Side B

04/13/2010 15:24:25

\\server05\productn\P\PIR\22-1\PIR101.txt

38

unknown

PACE INT ’L L. REV.

Seq: 38

13-APR-10

14:08

[Vol. 22:1

28218-3 pir_22-1 weschler Sheet No. 19 Side B

cations from prospective adoptive parents, investigating applicants to ensure that they will provide a healthy and nurturing
environment for adoptees, storing data on worldwide orphans,
investigating children’s backgrounds to confirm that they are
truly available for adoption, and developing rules governing the
intercountry adoption process. The agency’s decision-making
body would consist of representatives from every country that
has entrusted its intercountry adoptions to the agency. This
proposed agency would be similar to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), in which the decision-makers are member governments rather than a board of directors.212 By involving
representatives from numerous nations in the agency’s decision-making process, the needs and values of the many countries that engage in international adoptions will be considered.
However, unlike the WTO, not all decisions should require a
consensus because one nation’s representative could be a
“holdout” and prevent the adoption of a rule that all other representatives support. Whether the drafters of the agency’s
charter conclude that decisions should be taken by a simple majority or a two-thirds majority, each nation’s representative on
the decision-making body would have one vote regardless of
how many children their citizens adopt or put up for adoption
annually. This is an important feature because it will encourage all countries that engage in intercountry adoption to
participate, and also to avoid motivating unethical conduct (e.g.,
pressuring birth mothers to put their children up for adoption)
on the part of any nation in an attempt to procure additional
votes.
An international public agency responsible for intercountry
adoptions would lessen or even solve many of the problems encountered in the current system. First, this new system would
be much more efficient than the current intercountry adoption
regime. All data about orphans and prospective adoptive parents would be in one central database and the international
agency would possess the power to authorize the adoptions.
This, in turn, would eliminate the need for coordination between facilitators and agencies in sending and receiving coun212 See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org1_e.htm#council (last
visited Mar. 12, 2009).
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tries along with duplicative requirements for adoptive families.
In this way, prospective adopters would only have to satisfy the
conditions that the international agency’s decision-making body
promulgates, rather than the often repetitive and time-consuming requirements of multiple agencies and governments that exist in the current system. Thus, with a single regulatory body
governing the process, families will no longer have to navigate
multiple bodies of law, which will increase efficiency and lower
costs.
Furthermore, by significantly decreasing the costs and increasing the efficiency of the international adoption process, the
problems of child trafficking and abduction would be ameliorated because there would no longer be a financial incentive for
these crimes. Prospective adopters would no longer be willing
to pay high fees for children, as the costs of adopting through
the international agency will be substantially lower. The new
system would ensure that prospective adoptive parents are not
taken advantage of by individuals with a profit motive because
candidates seeking to adopt would directly apply to the international agency. In addition, the new system would serve to prevent adopters from having to put their trust and money in the
hands of adoption facilitators and questionable foreign agencies
and bureaucrats. To address the issue of timing as a motivation
for corruption, the international agency would match the numerous children in need of homes with families desiring children more quickly and efficiently than most international
adoptions are completed under the current regime. Thus, the
desperation that is one of the factors currently fueling the black
market for babies will no longer exist.
The proposed international agency would provide the children of all nations with the same opportunity to be adopted into
a loving and stable family, irrespective of their birth country’s
resources. As explained earlier, poor, developing countries lack
the resources to monitor and process intercountry adoptions.
The result is widespread corruption that leaves many adoptable
children languishing within their country’s poorly-run institutions. With the creation of an international agency, developing
nations would be relieved of this burden and could then reallocate their limited resources to other areas where they are desperately needed.
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The new system would also allow families who would like to
adopt but cannot afford to pay high fees for intercountry adoption to fulfill their dreams of raising an adoptive child, thereby
essentially eliminating the discrimination against less wealthy
families that exists under the current regime. The lower costs
of international adoption would flow from the aforementioned
efficiency gains as well as an elimination of the high fees
charged in the current system, which often include travel costs
and payoffs to foreign officials or institutions. From a long-term
perspective, making intercountry adoptions more efficient and
less costly can address the world’s overpopulation problem by
making adoption an attractive alternative to having biological
children.
The international agency would need to be structured to ensure transparency in its operations, which would eliminate the
corruption problems that exist in the current system. Transparency allows for easy monitoring and public scrutiny, thereby
making it difficult for corruption to occur. In addition, the
agreement establishing the agency should specify regular intervals for internal and external audits with the results made
available to the public in order to further combat corruption and
inefficiency.
Both sending and receiving nations would need to be incentivized to give the agency the authority to handle their international adoptions. One way to encourage widespread
participation is to involve both sending and receiving nations in
the process of developing the agency’s structure and guidelines.
This proposed incentive structure for participation resembles
that which was utilized for the drafting of the Hague Convention.213 By involving both sending and receiving nations in the
drafting of the treaty creating the agency, both types of nations
will be more likely to accept and ratify the end product.
In addition to the administrative body, there should be an
international family court to adjudicate disputes relating to intercountry adoptions. In general, enforcement mechanisms in
international law are severely inadequate.214 Unlike the ICJ,
which only litigates cases between states,215 the international
Pfund, supra note 138, at 1134.
Hubing, supra note 5, at 679.
Id.
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family court should provide a means of relief for the private parties involved in the intercountry adoption process. There is a
great need for legal protection for private parties, which include
prospective adoptive parents, biological parents, and adoptees.
The legal need to protect these parties is particularly necessary
to address the corruption of which they are often victims in the
current system. However, as the international agency becomes
established, it is expected that claims from these parties would
decrease significantly due to the new system’s many safeguards
against corruption and unethical conduct.
Both the international agency and family court would need
adequate funding to efficiently handle adoption cases for many
nations while ensuring that the children are placed in safe, loving homes. The agency would need to employ a large staff with
qualified employees in every participating country to collect
data and oversee the intercountry adoptions on a local level
under the agency’s authority. Potential funding sources include
the UN, participating nations (based on a sliding scale related
to the countries’ abilities to contribute), corporations, private
philanthropists and adoptive parents. One source of UN funds
that would not require additional contributions is the reassignment of the funds used to support the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) following their
dissolution in 2010.216 The combined cost of the two tribunals is
$100 million per year,217 which are funds that could be partially
or completely reallocated to support the intercountry adoption
agency and family court. Considering that the physical and
psychological well-being of millions of children is at stake, there
is an urgent need for funding institutions to make intercountry
adoption an international priority.
CONCLUSION
Intercountry adoption has received a great deal of international attention in recent years, in large part due to the
216 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Splits Prosecutorial Duties For Rwanda, Yugoslavia Tribunals, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1503,
U.N. Doc. SC/7859 (Aug. 28, 2003).
217 Michael Voss, Sierra Leonians Face UN Court, BBC NEWS, Mar. 21, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1885357.stm.
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problems of the current system. Despite attempts to create international agreements and regulations for the process, the system continues to be plagued with corruption, inefficiency, and
discrimination. In response to these problems, both sending
and receiving nations have implemented hurdles to the international adoption process. From an ethical standpoint, though,
the answer is not to halt or hinder intercountry adoptions, but
rather to reform the current system and create the infrastructure necessary for the system to function efficiently, transparently, and ethically. When adoptions are restricted, the
millions of children in institutions and on the streets worldwide
are deprived of the opportunity to fulfill their basic physical and
psychological needs through international families eager to
adopt them. The numerous problems in the current system
have given rise to a great need for the practical solution of an
international agency and family court to manage intercountry
adoptions. This new system would increase efficiency and
transparency, decrease costs, eradicate discrimination, and better protect the rights of adoptive parents, adoptees, and birth
mothers. Most importantly, the new system would give each orphaned and homeless child a chance to grow up in a stable and
loving environment, which would truly fulfill the paramount international goal of promoting the “best interests of the child.”
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